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This article takes what has always been a methodological and ethical question for 
anthropologists (how should we relate to others?) and turns it into an ethnographic one 
(how do those we study think ethically across borders?).  We show that, paradoxically, 
anthropologists’ commitment to their own forms of ethics across borders have frequently 
effaced alternative conceptions among the people we study, whilst the burgeoning field 
of the anthropology of ethics has reintroduced ideas of cultural boundedness and 
incommensurability into the anthropological canon. Moreover, within anthropology, 
a focus on either universal motivation or cultural relativism has obscured ethics across 
borders, which as a practice is premised on both the existence of ethical difference and 
the possibility of transcending it. In relation to an example taken from Evans’ work on 
Ahmadi Muslims in India, we develop the idea that ethics across borders depends as much 
on the creative production and elaboration of incommensurable difference—a process 
we call “incommensuration”—as on the identification of affinities. As suggested by the 
collection this essay introduces, ethics across borders in this sense must be widespread, 
and deserves greater ethnographic attention, particularly with regard to the diverse ways in 
which difference and affinity are imagined.
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What should happen when cultures meet? Are there models of excellence in inter-
cultural exchange to be celebrated and emulated? Should ethical standards be ex-
tended across borders regardless of cultural difference, or should some differences 
be respected? Are there some areas of human activity in which diversity of values 
and practice can be appreciated and even celebrated and others in which universal 
standards ought to be observed? Can members of one ethical community evaluate 
or learn values from members of another? 
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These are questions about ethics across borders. They will be familiar because 
they are questions that have occupied anthropologists a great deal, to the extent 
that we might even say that they are anthropological questions. But they are ques-
tions that are not asked by anthropologists alone. Making judgments about the pro-
priety of ways of interacting with ethical traditions other than one’s own is one of 
the defining aspects of the discipline. Yet anthropologists’ own preoccupation with 
these questions has caused us to neglect the fact that all humans are confronted by 
these same questions and that they have their own, diverse, answers to them. Our 
aim, then, is to take what has always been an ethical or methodological question for 
anthropologists and turn it into an ethnographic one, to ask not how one culture 
ought to relate to another and to one another’s values, but how people in diverse 
times and places have formulated responses to that problem. 
In this essay, we do not intend to rehearse the whole history of anthropological 
ethics across borders, but it will be useful to draw attention to aspects of it in order 
to distinguish what we, together with the other contributors to this collection, are 
trying to achieve. Many anthropologists in both the Malinowskian and Boasian 
traditions have used ethnographic findings to encourage one kind of ethics across 
borders—a respect for difference between societies and cultures—and discou-
rage another kind—judgment of non-Euro-American cultures as morally inferior 
and as potential objects of intervention. This approach reached its apogee in the 
American Anthropological Association’s famous “Statement on human rights,” 
a short document submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1947. 
The “Statement” enjoins respect for cultural difference on the grounds that “the 
individual realizes his personality through his culture” (American Anthropological 
Association 1947: 541), and asserts that
Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive 
so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs 
or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the 
applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole. 
(1947: 542) 
The authors insist that “man is free only when he lives as his society defines free-
dom” (ibid.: 543). Intervention is not ruled out altogether, but it should rely on 
calling attention to a culture’s own underlying values to help bring its people to 
awareness of injustices in their own terms (ibid.). 
The anthropological tradition of ethics across borders to which the AAA “State-
ment” belongs is often taken to be an example of normative moral relativism.1 That 
is not surprising—it has been most confidently asserted in opposition to univer-
salist positions, so it seems relativist in contrast. However, it also has universalist 
elements, and they are no less important to its logic than its relativist ones. Classi-
cal anthropological ethics across borders could be summed up as a call to ground 
intercultural interaction on broadly defined values shared by humanity—“what 
makes us human”—rather than narrowly understood ones determined by a single 
1. For example in Geertz’s lecture on “anti anti-relativism” (1984), and Richard Rorty’s 
response to it (1990). 
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culture. Especially suspect for anthropologists are values associated peculiarly with 
the West or with global trade.2
Anthropologists agree about little, and there is no reason to expect that their 
attitudes to ethics across borders will be any different. Nonetheless, in the very 
wide variety of discussions regarding anthropological ethics across borders—
from Melville Herskovitz (who was the main author of the “Statement”) to Joel 
Robbins (who has argued for universal values, see Robbins 2010)—two problema-
tics or areas of concern are present.3 We suggest that these two aspects are key to 
understanding any form of ethics across borders, and although these have been 
extensively theorized with regard to anthropologists’ own practice, they are often 
ignored as spaces of debate for the people we study. Consequently, understanding 
other people’s answers to the questions raised by these two areas of concern will be 
central to any attempt to understand the phenomenon ethnographically.
Area of concern 1: How are the borders understood? Any form of ethics across 
borders requires some conception of units and the borders that separate those 
units. In the AAA’s “Statement,” those units were cultures, and the borders between 
them were borders of cultural difference, for in 1947 it was still possible to see 
anthropology as a science of the objective reality of human cultures. Today most 
anthropologists are more circumspect; more aware of the shortcomings of the “cul-
ture” concept. A question remains, however, as to what kind of ethical units are be-
ing objectified. Are people engaging in various ways with the now global discourse 
of “culture” in order to frame their encounters in terms of borders of cultural diffe-
rence? If not, what kinds of objectification do they engage with in order to concep-
tualize units of difference? Are the things being separated by borders even “units” 
in any traditional sense?
Area of concern 2: What are the affinities that allow the borders to be bridged? If 
ethics across borders is not to dissolve into thoroughgoing relativism, then there 
must also be a conception of affinities or similarities that transcend the borders. 
According to the “Statement” in its more universalist mode, the “hard core of 
similarities between cultures” includes people’s “tolerance for behavior of another 
group different than their own” (1947: 540). Similar claims about the universal, 
general values that underlie more superficial, specific ethical variation are the basis 
for ethically engaged work, from Sol Tax’s action anthropology (1975) to Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes’ “engaged” anthropology (1995). Other people engaging in ethics 
across borders will also need to determine a common currency in which diffe-
rences can be communicated, even if, as we argue below, this currency is sometimes 
the mutual appreciation, or simply the mutual toleration, of incommensurable 
difference. 
The project of understanding ethics across borders, then, becomes one of un-
derstanding the particular ways similarity and difference are understood by those 
involved. Paradoxically, anthropologists’ commitment to their own forms of ethics 
2. See Washburn (1987) for an argument relating the AAA’s “Statement on human rights” to the alienation of US anthropologists from their own society and its values.
3. See Mair (2014) for a discussion of both areas of concern in the context of inter-national Buddhism.
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across borders, which are frequently couched in particular ideas about difference 
and affinity, can lead to the effacement of alternative conceptions and practices 
among the people we study. 
We are not the first to make this suggestion. Indeed, a key strand of Roy Wagner’s 
Invention of culture (1975) is an extended meditation upon the manner in which 
the culture concept can mask both our own processes of invention and those of 
others.4 For Wagner, anthropology has traditionally been a process of “inventing” 
culture. Yet this is a move that creates a “relation” that is perhaps more real than 
the thing it invents (ibid.: 4). The anthropologist in the field is never just “going 
native”—rather she is inventing a relation that presupposes a cultural world of her 
own invention. This notion of culture, however, is always inadequate for the inven-
tion of the other, and when we treat these constructions of culture as real, we risk 
turning anthropology into a wax museum (ibid.: 27–28). This invention of a rela-
tion results in a vivisection of local meaning where we can believe only the local 
meanings or our own (ibid.: 30). Moreover, it is predicated upon an invention of 
the natural world, for to create the concept of culture we have had to simultane-
ously separate it from a nature. Nature is objectified through our notion of culture, 
and in doing so we erase the traces not only of our own invention, but also that of 
the other. We thus turn the other’s invention into nothing more than knowledge or 
fact (ibid.: 156). This is the point that is most salient for our current argument. To 
write anthropologies of “culture” is, for Wagner, to obscure the process of inven-
tion and creativity that lies behind both our own creation of relations, and others’ 
processes of doing the same. Moreover, this results in a situation such that when the 
other attempts to invent us in the same way as we invent them, their efforts are met 
with pity and derision (ibid.: 20). For Wagner, the only response is to learn how to 
openly articulate the process of invention, for we have a stark choice: “We can learn 
to use invention, or else be used by it” (ibid.: 158).
Wagner thus shows that our own processes of relating to others might serve 
to mask, obscure, and render invisible what we here call ethics across borders. 
We objectify the other in a fact-bound culture and thus miss the creative acts by 
which they conceptually invent relations to others. A question therefore arises as to 
whether we can recapture a way of speaking about the other that also acknowledges 
their capacity to create the same kind of relations of difference that anthropologists 
create. This collection should be considered a belated attempt to extend Wagner’s 
call to recognize in those we study the same inventive creativity that anthropolo-
gists exercise (ibid.: 16). When we speak of borders, we are thus not trying to fix 
a concrete definition, but calling for ethnographic attention to the various ways in 
which difference is and has been conceived. 
So much for borders. Why, then, are we particularly interested in ethics across 
borders? Thanks to Wagner’s arguments, and to a slew of other critical work on 
the culture concept published in the 1980s (e.g., Boon 1983; Clifford and Marcus 
1986), anthropologists are, in general, much less likely than they once were to write 
4. We are grateful to Giovanni da Col for reminding us that this is only one part of 
Wagner’s discussion of the dialectics of invention, in which “it is impossible to objec-
tify, to invent something, without ‘counterinventing’ its opposite” (Wagner 1975: 39).
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about bounded wholes. In contrast, however, in anthropological work on ethics,5 
the idea of discrete cultures as the source of ethical values persists in one form or 
another; indeed it has been suggested that terms such as “ethics” or “morality” are 
merely functioning as replacements for earlier notions of culture (Zigon 2007). 
In fact, the emergence of the anthropology of ethics as an identifiable subdisci-
pline over the past decade and a half has seen a resurgence of the idea of bounded-
ness, whether the bounded entities are described explicitly as cultures (see Robbins 
2004 and 2010 for an explicit call to return to a Dumontian concept of culture as 
a systematic and coherent whole) or more commonly as ethical traditions (Asad 
1986; Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006; Agrama 2010; Laidlaw 2014). In either 
case, the categories of analysis define the nature of the units, the borders between 
them, and specify the object of study as lying within those borders. While we ap-
plaud the work produced by scholars working with these concepts, we also feel that 
attempts to formulate quite concrete accounts of the organization of ethical diffe-
rence, usually based on thinkers in the Western academic tradition of philosophy, 
are likely to obscure alternative and diverse accounts of metaethics that are part of 
what we ought to be describing. 
The emphasis on bounded, incommensurable ethical traditions in the anthro-
pology of ethics can largely be attributed to the influence of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(MacIntyre 1984, 1988, 1990), particularly via the work of Talal Asad (1986), which 
has led anthropologists to claim, for instance, that ethical traditions create horizons 
“within which reasoning might occur” (Hirschkind 1995: 474). MacIntyre’s posi-
tion is not that some pairs of ethical traditions happen, contingently, to be incom-
mensurable. Rather, he makes incommensurability the defining essence of the ethi-
cal. Ethical practices and traditions are defined by goods “internal to a practice,” 
that is, values that cannot be explained in terms of external criteria (MacIntyre 
1984: 218). 
The anthropology of ethics has been very successful in conceptualizing how 
people come to live ethical lives within the parameters of such traditions. Yet pre-
cisely because of the focus on self-aware conversations through time, such studies 
have tended to neglect the question of how movement between these traditions, 
and conversation across the borders that separate them, might themselves be im-
portant aspects of ethical life. 
Two prominent anthropologists of ethics have specifically discussed contact 
and exchange between different ethical traditions. Joel Robbins (2004) has written 
about the tensions between Christianity and traditional, local morality in Papua 
New Guinea, while James Laidlaw (2011) has written about the synthesis of tra-
ditional Jain ethics of compassion and vegetarianism with environmentalism and 
animal rights. Neither of these case studies, as reported by these authors, seems to 
us to be an instance of ethics across borders as we have defined the phenomenon 
here.
Laidlaw argues that young Jains have emphasized the compatibility of Jain eth-
ics with that of Western animal rights movements, but in the process they have 
5. Another area that has seen a resurgence in ideas of boundedness is anthropology of the 
“ontological turn,” which, for reasons of space, we do not deal with here, but see Bessire 
and Bond (2014) for a discussion of the problem of boundedness for this literature.
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quietly forgotten an important difference: whereas environmentalists cultivate a 
love for the world, traditional Jain ethics demands cultivation of disgust for it. In 
the case studies presented by Laidlaw, the ethical innovators seem to be unreflec-
tive about the fundamental difference in orientation to the world in traditional Jain 
ethics and environmentalism, so their account is, in our terms, all about affinity 
and not at all about difference. Robbins argues that Christianity carries with it an 
account of culture that envisages a radical rupture with the past on conversion, that 
is, in our terms, an account that is all about difference and not at all about affinities.
Ironically, MacIntyre’s most important work is based on analyses of successful 
instances of ethics across borders—especially Aquinas’ historic effort to reconcile 
Augustinian and Aristotelian ethics (MacIntyre 1990)—he sees these events as his-
torically unique moments; paradigm-shifting exceptions to the ordinary science, as 
it were, of ethical traditions. On this model, ethics across borders is not an ongoing 
encounter, but a short-lived event, since each instance results in the borders being 
dissolved. 
John Marenbon (this collection) draws particular attention to this aspect of 
MacIntyre’s thought. If only a tiny number of geniuses whose names stand out in 
the history of thought—such as Dante and Aquinas—are able to see the deep in-
commensurability clearly enough to propose ways of overcoming it, then does this 
mean that, for everyone else, the problem of ethical difference appears merely as 
a superficial issue of translation? Does this mean that, for the rest of us, encoun-
ters between diverse ethical traditions are destined to remain mired in confusion? 
There is an urgency to this question for anthropology, if only because practitioners 
of our discipline have, in recent years, been tempted to see themselves as precisely 
those geniuses who might comprehend gulfs of incommensurability that elude ev-
erybody else. We refer, of course, to the ontological turn, and its presumption of 
“a cosmos of boundaries that only its ordained authorities can magically cross” 
(Bessire and Bond 2014: 449).
In the course of our own research, on Ahmadis in northern India (Evans) and 
on a Taiwanese Buddhist movement (Mair, see also Mair 2014), we have both en-
countered everyday Aquinases, working with their own alternative accounts of eth-
ical difference and affinity, which serve in each case as a charter for a very different 
ethics across borders. The contributors to this collection further demonstrate that 
self-conscious ethical traditions can be defined by reflective conversations with 
real and imagined interlocutors outside of the tradition.6 The main purpose of this 
introduction, then, is to clear the ground conceptually to make way for more eth-
nographically informed accounts of ethics across borders of the kind included in 
this collection. 
In the first part of this essay, we examine why anthropology, despite its histori-
cal interest in otherness, has often failed to attend to those moments when people 
engage in questions of value across difference. We argue that the premises of an-
thropological accounts of practical reason—and in fact the premises of accounts 
of practical reason throughout the social sciences—impose specific models of the 
6. See also Michael Lempert’s work on the important role of “shadow interlocutors”—
imagined representatives of Western and Chinese publics—in ethical practice in the 
contemporary Tibetan diaspora (Lempert 2012: 85).
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relationship of values and borders that make it difficult to see alternative, local 
models in action. Later, in the second part, we examine how practices and plays 
upon and across borders result in processes of differentiation, commensuration, 
and what we call “incommensuration.” In some cases, commensuration—find-
ing affinities that can serve as a bridge to overcome borders of alterity—is seen as 
the basis of ethics across borders. In others, via a practice of “incommensuration,” 
incommensurability is carefully highlighted and elaborated and made the object 
around which ethical relations can be built, as illustrated here through an example 
taken from Evans’ work on Ahmadi Muslims in India. Finally, in the conclusion, we 
argue that anthropological ideas about the proper way to relate to otherness have 
distracted us from the task of turning a dispassionate ethnographic eye on other 
people’s answers to analogous questions. 
Anthropology, social science, and ethics across borders
Methodological relativism and political economy
Beyond anthropology, key aspects of the social sciences in general have tended to 
hide vernacular ethics across borders from view. Throughout the social sciences, 
accounts of practical reason are usually based on one of two approaches, whose 
proponents often see them as mutually exclusive. 
One of these approaches starts with what are, often implicitly, taken to be uni-
versal and self-evident human motivations or values: pleasure and the avoidance of 
pain, utility, the pursuit of power, or the desire to survive and leave descendants. This 
is what might be called the political economy approach, whose genealogy in social 
theory can be traced at least as far back as Hobbes and Machiavelli, and whose cham-
pions are found today in the disciplines of economics and international relations. 
Applying this approach to cases of ethical diversity means assuming that differences 
are superficial and mask more fundamental, shared values. Since it is a metho-
dological assumption of this political economy approach that all human beings are 
motivated by the same rational goals, no genuine ethical disagreement is possible; 
conflict just as much as cooperation can be explained in terms of the universal value 
of self-interest. When actors have different immediate goals, it is because they are 
differently positioned with respect to the resources through which they are related.
The other approach is methodological relativism. Relativism in this sense as-
sumes that the fundamental goals that motivate human behavior are not universal, 
but derive in one way or another from historically constituted cultures, communi-
ties, and languages. This approach seeks to interpret human action by elucidating 
those culturally and historically specific values as a context within which action has 
meaning. In its modern form, methodological relativism originates with Durkheim, 
and it has, of course, been enormously influential among anthropologists. Human 
universals may enter into relativist accounts in relation to the form, but not the 
content, of ethics. For instance, relativist anthropologists may emphasize the im-
portance of ritual or communitas or universal structures of thought, but the trans-
historical significance of these processes lies in the inculcation of historically spe-
cific values. A methodological relativist attempts to explain action with respect to 
the actor’s specific values, not the universal processes by which she acquired them. 
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We have already outlined two areas of concern that we see as essential to ethics 
across borders: a conception of the differences that constitute the borders, and an 
understanding of the affinities that make crossing the borders possible. It will be 
apparent that each of the two dominant social scientific approaches to explaining 
differences in human values ignores as a matter of method one of the two elements.
The relativist approach can accommodate the first part of the equation, the dif-
ference: on each side of the putative border are complexes of values that are associa-
ted with some particular society or culture and which make sense in their own 
terms to people who have been properly socialized into them. But it has no resour-
ces for accounting for the second part of the equation, the affinities, so meetings of 
distinct sociocultural traditions are either ignored or presented as misunderstand-
ings: conversations at cross-purposes whose participants are hopelessly trapped in 
their own symbolic systems and webs of belief.
Meanwhile, a political economy approach can deal with the second of the two 
areas of concern for ethics across borders that we outlined above—universal af-
finities—but not the first. Ethical difference may be present in political economy 
accounts, but only in the form of “ideology”—a mystification of power relations 
whose origins must be explained in terms of the universal goals of rational actors. 
Alternatively, culture is invoked to explain superficial differences, the logic often 
being that the more culture one has, the more one’s view of actual power relations 
is obscured.7 
Structure, agency, and practice theory
From the late 1970s, some sociologists and anthropologists began to be dissatisfied 
with the unresolved tension between the two dominant explanatory strategies, the 
impetus for this being a growth in interest in Marxist analyses of class and domina-
tion. Anthropologists, whose interest in the power of culture to make worlds had 
always made them natural methodological relativists, increasingly came to incor-
porate Marxist-inspired political economy explanations into their work (e.g., the 
work of Claude Meillassoux).
The traditional anthropological emphasis on structure explained human mo-
tivation in terms of values and meanings inculcated in the individual by a cohe-
rent social framework made up of some combination (depending on the author’s 
theoretical commitments) of meanings, institutions, habits, emotions, and values. 
This had proven a powerful approach, but it seemed to rule out of consideration 
the things that the new political anthropology was interested in: change in relation 
to the external stimuli of colonialism and the capitalist system, and struggle and 
competition between individuals and groups whose interests clashed. As Eric Wolf 
7. João de Pina-Cabral has argued that the failure of social scientists to see beyond the 
dichotomy of cognitive relativism and cognitive universalism is due to the “hegemonic 
strength of the all-or-nothing fallacy” (2014: 68). That is to say, we tend to believe either 
that our reasoning is based on empirical reality or that it is constructed by language and 
culture; the third position, that cognition is a mixture of these two processes, is rarely 
considered. The positions we are describing here in relation to practical reason are 
analogous to those Pina-Cabral describes for cognition in general, and the same fallacy 
surely applies here too.
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famously observed, it led to a view of homogeneous cultures as billiard balls that 
spun off against one another (Wolf 2010: 6–7).
This billiard ball approach, however, also raised more fundamental problems 
about free will and agency, which Sherry Ortner diagnosed: “There is actually a 
profound philosophic issue here: how, if actors are fully cultural beings, they could 
ever do anything that does not in some way carry forward core cultural assump-
tions” (1984: 155). Methodological relativism is based on the premise that struc-
tures—culture, language, and institutions—are prior and determine the thought 
and action of individual actors. Political economy is premised on the claim that the 
agency of individuals and groups—acting in pursuit of universal goals—is prior, 
and that structure is nothing more than the cumulative effect of the exercise of 
agency. Because of this disagreement about explanatory priority, the conundrum 
came to be known as the “structure/agency problem.” 
Ortner coined the term “practice theory” (1984) to refer to a loosely aligned 
set of approaches already developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Anthony Giddens 
(1979), and others that sought to overcome the structure/agency problem by pro-
ducing a working synthesis of methodological relativism and political economy. 
Strategic decision making, in which individuals and groups acted in ways that were 
not prescribed by structure, was introduced into the mix. For example, Bourdieu 
argued that individuals employed culture in practice to dominate and inflict sym-
bolic violence on others. However, as Ortner showed, far from producing a ba-
lanced synthesis between methodological relativism and political economy, this 
approach made structure subordinate to agency, so that practice theory was ulti-
mately just a more elaborate form of political economy:
The model is that of an essentially individualistic, and somewhat 
aggressive, actor, self-interested, rational, pragmatic, and perhaps with a 
maximizing orientation as well. What actors do, it is assumed, is rationally 
go after what they want, and what they want is what is materially and 
politically useful for them within the context of their cultural and 
historical situations. (1984: 151)
Sahlins on conversations at cross-purposes
Marshall Sahlins’ contributions to practice theory and its attempts to overcome 
the structure/agency problem provide what we consider to be the most sophisti-
cated and sustained anthropological engagement with the topic of ethics across 
borders. Though he was at pains to point out that the processes he identified—
what he calls the “structure of the conjuncture” and “mythopraxis”—are not only 
observable in situations of culture contact, it is in these situations that they are 
cast in the clearest light. Specifically, it is the interaction of European colonia-
lists and residents of the Pacific area that furnish him with a series of examples in 
the many articles and books through which he makes his argument (e.g., Sahlins 
1985, 2000). We will discuss one of these in detail, the British 1793 trade mission 
to China led by Lord Macartney, as it illustrates the benefits and limitations of 
Sahlins’ approach.
The mission was sent because the British were facing ruin on account of their 
desire for Chinese products such as silk and porcelain and above all their addiction 
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to tea. The Chinese government permitted foreigners to trade only from a single 
small location in Canton (Guangdong) and imposed hefty taxes on the import of 
foreign goods. Worse still, the Chinese merchants were disdainful of the foreigners’ 
wares, often insisting on payment in silver (Sahlins 2000: 425). 
The Macartney mission carried boatloads of the latest and most ingenious 
products of British science and industry, which “were supposed to communicate 
a whole political, intellectual, and moral culture” (Hevia 1995: 135, quoted in 
Sahlins 2000: 430). Macartney was “to impress the Chinese court with the pow-
ers of his own civilization, represented as the extension of the virtues of his own 
king” (Sahlins 2000: 425) in order to induce the emperor to enter into diplomatic 
relations with Britain and ultimately to allow for more liberal conditions of trade 
to be negotiated. 
The mission was a miserable failure, dismissed with a high-handed letter from 
the Qianlong emperor thanking George III for his submission and assuring him 
that the Chinese had not “the slightest need for your country’s manufactures” 
(quoted in Cranmer-Byng 1962: 337, 340; Sahlins 2000: 422).
Sahlins puts the fracas down to a tragic mismatch between British and Chinese 
concepts of civilization. Though these concepts may have been superficially simi-
lar, he argues that they were enmeshed in complex and radically different moral 
cosmologies. For the British, the gifts they bore were “self-evident signs of an in-
dustrial logic of the concrete” in which were encoded information about the virtues 
of the British people and the majesty of their king (Sahlins 2000: 429). The sheer 
variety of clocks and astronomical instruments and other contrivances, as well as 
their ingenuity, could act as indices of national virtue for the British because of 
what Sahlins describes as “the native Western theory of the systematic relation be-
tween technology and civilization” (ibid.: 431).
In Sahlins’ account, these associations were lost on the Chinese. The Chinese 
“cosmography of civilization” (ibid.: 435) was, he claims, based on the distinction 
between inner and outer, with the emperor, the source of civilization, at the center, 
and concentric domains of ever less civilized, ever more barbaric regions radia-
ting away from him. If the emperor was virtuous, then foreigners would be drawn 
toward the imperial center to pay tribute and submit to his virtue, in order to be 
transformed. The variety of the foreign and exotic would thus come to be encapsu-
lated by the empire. This was represented in Chinese parks and gardens, in which 
variety and strangeness were cultivated, in contrast to the ordered, uniform, and 
symmetrical Chinese house. So in this model, the variety and novelty of the British 
offering, precisely the characteristics that the British hoped would convince the 
Chinese of their preeminence, in fact achieved the opposite, and confirmed their 
barbarian status.
In this and his other work on intercultural contact, Sahlins had two targets. 
On the one hand, he wanted to argue against the methodological relativism of the 
historians of the Annales School, who advocated a history of culture-bound struc-
tures that downplayed the importance of events and the autonomy of individuals. 
Sahlins insisted that events and the acts of individuals were crucial to understand-
ing history, and even to understanding changes in structure. On the other hand, he 
wanted to vindicate the practice of anthropology in a context in which World Sys-
tem scholars were suggesting its utility was coming to an end because all societies 
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were being incorporated into a single system that only had room for narrow eco-
nomic rationality (Sahlins 1993). Against this position, Sahlins’ aim was to show 
that even self-interested economic rationality must derive the values by which self-
interest is understood from “cosmologies” whose full extent and power can only be 
understood ethnographically. 
Although Sahlins’ goal was to overcome the structure/agency dichotomy, it is 
clear that in his account of the Macartney mission, structure, in the form of moral 
cosmologies of value, has the upper hand.8 The British and Chinese sides were 
each working toward goals rationally, but in Sahlins’ account the values in terms 
of which their goals are understood as desirable are inseparably linked to a sym-
bolic structure. These cosmologies, as he calls them, are supposed to derive their 
inescapable force from their complex imbrication in every aspect of cognition and 
action. 
As every novel encounter and every struggle to revalue the goods through 
which power is expressed is—can only be—understood in terms of cosmologies 
of value, Sahlins’ model is ultimately a methodological relativist account, and there 
is thus no room in it for ethics across borders. In the Macartney affair, the British 
used their symbols and the Chinese read them, each in their own terms, and each 
apparently unaware that the other side was working on the basis of different values. 
Reading Sahlins’ case studies, it is hard not to come away with a pessimistic 
feeling, because it appears from his accounts that the history of intercultural com-
munication is an unbroken chain of misunderstandings and conversations at cross-
purposes. When, in another case studied by Sahlins, Hawaiian women acted on 
traditional understandings and demanded that the British sailors who arrived with 
Cook had sex with them in order that their children, and so their lineages, might 
share in the Britons chiefly/godly mana, the sailors thought they were prostitutes 
and paid them in iron goods (Sahlins 2000: 289). These payments, Sahlins argues, 
were in turn (mis)interpreted by the Hawaiians in ways unimagined by the sailors. 
He traces similar confused mutual misinterpretations in relation to the cosmologi-
cal meaning of weapons for Europeans and locals in Fiji (ibid.: 377–78). 
In his discussion of the Macartney mission, Sahlins was at pains to point out 
that no member of Macartney’s crew could speak Mandarin (ibid.: 248), and there 
is certainly no indication that anyone involved realized that the two sides were 
working with different premises. In fact, not only was the mission unable to com-
municate, Sahlins gives the impression that all trade between China and the West 
had been carried on for decades without real communication taking place, approv-
ingly quoting the historian Louis Dermigny, who described the foreign trading post 
at Canton as a place “through which passed silver and merchandise only, but by no 
means language or ideas, they [the Europeans] remained nearly completely mar-
ginal to a civilization which they gave up all hope of understanding” (Dermigny 
1964: 512, quoted in Sahlins 2000: 423). Similarly, he notes that Cook and his crew 
8. In other writings he has said explicitly that this was his goal. For instance, in a 2010 
piece written in memory of Claude Lévi-Strauss, he recalls a seminar in which the 
French anthropologist challenged his view of structuralism: “I was finally freed to re-
solve the long-standing opposition between praxis and culture by encompassing the 
former in the latter” (Sahlins 2010: 373).
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were not able to communicate freely with the Hawaiians, as they did not learn the 
language, merely collecting isolated items of vocabulary, as they collected samples 
of local flora. 
In Sahlins’ accounts, the British, Chinese, Hawaiians, and Fijians operate with-
out any understanding that there might be values other than their own. Macartney 
addressed the Chinese court in the same symbolic language as he would have used 
back home, just as the Chinese interpreted the symbolic gifts of the foreigners in 
their own terms alone. This may be an accurate account of these particular cases,9 
but the studies we have gathered in this collection show that this is not the only 
way that groups of people and their disparate ideas can encounter each other. We 
do not have to take a side in the structure/agency debate in order to understand 
that Sahlins’ methodological relativism led him to formulate an idea of culture, 
or “moral cosmology,” that underestimates the capacity of the people involved to 
generate their own comparisons based on their own invented borders of difference.
Thus, although Sahlins attempted to provide a solution to the structure/agency 
problem, his failure to escape this dichotomous way of thinking ultimately led him 
only to add nuance to the account of the multiple linkages between forms of struc-
ture and forms of individual goal-driven rationality. The result is an analysis that 
focuses upon the incommensurable rather than taking as its problematic the no-
tion of ethical work across borders.
There are interesting parallels between MacIntyre’s approach to medieval 
thought and Sahlins’ accounts of culture contact in the Pacific region. Sahlins’ in-
terpretation of particular instances of confusing and confused intercultural contact 
are persuasive. And yet as a set of examples from which to understand the en-
counter of diverse values in general, his selection is partial and unrepresentative. 
The cases chosen by Sahlins are all taken from situations in which communication 
was minimal, at least on his account. In the same way, as Marenbon argues (this 
collection), MacIntyre portrays ordinary medieval Christians as misunderstanding 
classical models by applying their own standards to them, waiting for an Aquinas 
or a Dante (or an anthropologist) to apply unique insight in order to produce a new 
hybrid ethical tradition. 
Anthropological approaches to mixed and multiple traditions
In Sahlins’ work, cosmologies were brought together in moments of seismic fric-
tion. His focus was upon units of civilization as they grated, rubbed, and ground 
against one another. Yet in recent decades, across anthropology, there has been 
a shift toward a consideration of the individual subject as the object of analysis, 
and ethnographers have increasingly sought to locate the fractures of the global 
world within the private spaces of the individual. Influenced in particular by Homi 
Bhabha’s work on the postcolonial (1994), anthropologists have positioned them-
selves against earlier models that privileged essentialized cultural identities in or-
der to understand how mixing, abrasion, and friction have produced new forms of 
hybrid identity.
9. Other treatments of the Macartney mission, however, add that the initial standoff over 
the prostrations that foreign guests were expected to make to the emperor was in the 
end settled in a way that was satisfactory to both parties (Esherick 1998).
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Why do we need a specific notion of ethics across borders when theory is now 
concerned with probing the way in which individual ethical selves are produced 
out of multiple strands, traditions, and discourses that are never stable or pure? The 
articles in this collection ask how ethical conversations are articulated across diffe-
rence. As we will see, this is not because we see difference as something that is fixed 
in the world: often, processes of differentiation are a prerequisite for ethics across 
borders. Certainly, many of the examples given in this collection are of people 
speaking from a hybrid position (e.g., Lorenz), and yet our interest lies in how they 
then position themselves as they speak out across felt and constructed boundaries. 
Hybrid identities are never absolute; people always also make strategic claims to 
essentialist belonging (Moore 1997: 141). The contributions to this collection ask 
what the consequences for ethical discourse across boundaries and borders might 
be as people shift between hybrid and essentialized registers of belonging.
In particular, work on the mimetic, hybrid postcolonial subject has been po-
litically and morally important for demonstrating both the psychological toll such 
fractured sense of self can have on the individual (e.g., Fanon 1967), and the possi-
bilities of resistance and mockery that inhere in the mimesis of power (e.g., Taussig 
1993). Yet as James Ferguson (2002: 565) notes, the focus of such studies upon the 
dyadic relationship of colonized and colonizer, North and South, rich and poor, 
can sometimes blind us to the way in which fractured identities and mimetic perso-
nas might be put to use as “moral claims” for belonging to a wider global order. The 
point, of course, is that what is often seen as a pathologically fractured self can from 
another angle be understood as the performative enactment of an ethical dialogue 
across borders. Our goal is thus to extend the ways in which anthropologists have 
thought about those moments when people are caught at the interstices of tradi-
tions; a topic that has been of much interest in recent years. 
Commensuration, incommensurability, and incommensuration
We have already noted the influence of MacIntyre’s view that ethical traditions are 
incommensurable. Other philosophers, who come from disparate traditions and 
often have little in common with MacIntyre, have also come to this conclusion, 
and they have been equally important for recent anthropological formulations of 
the ethical. We think particularly of Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Lambek, this col-
lection), and Bernard Williams (2006: 157). This idea of incommensurability has 
largely been embraced by anthropologists, and it is central to what we identify as 
the anthropological elision of ethnographic cases of ethics across borders.
What if we instead turn our attention to the way people negotiate questions 
of similarity and difference, in situations in which commensurability and incom-
mensurability are not givens but rather practices that require careful management? 
Anthropologists have for some time considered commensuration to be a process 
that enables disparate elements to be brought together under a common standard 
of value, rule, or governance (Espeland and Stevens 1998; Povinelli 2001). Should 
incommensuration also be thought of as a process and practice? 
An illustration can be drawn from Evans’ ethnography of India’s Ahmadiyya 
Muslim Community. The Ahmadis, in spite of their claims to be Muslim, are 
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widely viewed by other Muslims in the subcontinent as heretics. The group claims 
that the promised Messiah of Islam and all world religions was born in Punjab 
in the 1830s, and they ground this belief in a large body of elaborate proofs and 
prophecies. Their strongly proselytizing ethic means that they are no strangers to 
publicly airing these proofs in debates with members of other religions, and yet 
alongside a polemical attitude to proving the superiority of their claims, they also 
often engage in forms of interfaith activity that are explicitly not designed to con-
vert others, but are rather aimed at creating dialogue. Such events frequently take 
the form of “Peace Symposia,” which adopt a standardized structure, and which 
occur around the world wherever there are Ahmadi communities. This universal 
model is the result of the Peace Symposia being devised and spearheaded by the 
leader of the community, who is based in London. These events invariably involve 
non-Muslim religious leaders, along with various dignitaries, including politicians, 
being invited to give short speeches on the topic of achieving peace. The Symposia 
are taken extremely seriously by the Ahmadis as an exercise in what we have here 
called ethics across borders. 
The Peace Symposia are structured so as to encourage the proliferation and 
flourishing of very specific forms of difference. Speeches by Ahmadi delegates tend 
to be affirmations of a particular kind of pluralism. Difference is celebrated, as 
long as it is difference that exists within the bounds of an accepted form; it is a 
celebration of diversity that actually creates uniformity and homogeneity at a struc-
tural level (Wilk 1995). Thus, for example, religious difference and otherness are 
celebrated only insofar as religions are seen to conform to a specific definition in 
which all examples are directly comparable, symbolic-cultural forms (cf. Masuzawa 
2005). While this is a process of differentiation, it is thus simultaneously a prac-
tice of commensuration, for it involves bringing these values into a relation vis-
à-vis one another in such a way that they can be both compared and contrasted. 
The specific relations of discipline and value that structure each religion are dif-
ferentiated in a process whereby they are made comparable. Here, differentiation 
is commensuration.
Yet this practice of commensuration also involves a parallel practice of incom-
mensuration. Take, for example, Ahmadi discourse about the relationship between 
believers and the founders of religions. Often present at the Peace Symposia wit-
nessed by Evans were Sikh and Christian delegates. In Ahmadi literature, and 
in settings outside of the Peace Symposia, Ahmadis claim that they have defini-
tive, empirical proof—in the form of prophecy, scripture, and archaeological and 
linguistic evidence—that Jesus was a prophet who died a natural death (Ahmad 
2003). In a similar fashion, they claim to have both physical and prophetic proof 
that Guru Baba Nanak (the founder of Sikhism) was a Muslim saint. The Ahmadis 
thus accord a holy station to both Jesus and Baba Nanak, and yet the relationship 
that they have toward these figures is structured by a particular set of values: values 
that would not be recognized in any Sikh or Christian traditions.
In line with these claims, many Ahmadis at the Peace Symposia would publicly 
declare that they respect, or honor, Jesus and Guru Nanak. This was a distinctive 
way of phrasing their relationship to these figures, but one that enabled them to 
create a common ground of understanding, in which they could claim that every-
body present, including the Sikhs and Christians, was in agreement in respecting/
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honoring the founders of these religions. That the Christians and Sikhs present had 
fundamentally different ways of structuring their relationship to these figures re-
mained unspoken. Importantly, these different kinds of relationships and the al-
ternate regimes of value that they implied were not capable of being compared. 
The particular institutionalized nature of the peace conferences enabled them to 
become incommensurable. 
A similar practice can be observed in the manner in which Evans’ interlocutors 
articulated a notion of “equality” between religions. When an Ahmadi spoke at a 
Peace Symposium in Delhi in April 2012, addressing an audience of representa-
tives of multiple religious traditions, the speaker made a major point of expressing 
the equality of all religions. His goal was evidently to foster an ethical discourse 
between religious groups; a goal hailed as admirable by a number of those in atten-
dance. Yet, in order to make this argument, some things had to be commensurated 
and some incommensurated. Ahmadi literature states that all religions, including 
non-Abrahamic Indian religions, are a product of divine prophecy. Hence the pos-
sibility of commensuration, in which the speaker drew these religions together into 
a single realm of value, and thus a common notion sacredness. For him, these reli-
gions are all equally a product of divine inspiration.
This commensuration, however, was made possible only by a simultaneous pro-
cess of the inverse. Ahmadi discourse, like that of many Muslim sects, sees religions 
as being hierarchically ranked; they may all be divine in origin, but they are chro-
nologically arranged in terms of truth, with the older religions being more corrupt 
and less complete in their message. It is only Islam that stands at the top of this hier-
archy as being both comprehensive and pure. This is obviously a point that would 
not be accepted by most of the audience. In order to commensurate, the speaker 
thus also had to incommensurate this system of values. It was not just about hiding 
or concealing these ideas; rather it was about working toward a particular con-
struction in which the forms of value structuring his own notion of sacred, and the 
forms of value structuring his audiences’ notions of the sacred, were not differenti-
ated but arranged vis-à-vis one another in such a way as to not admit comparison. 
Incommensurability is, in other words, quite different from difference. 
The Ahmadis and their partners in dialogue have distinct ethical traditions with 
distinct forms of value and relationships of sacredness. Rather than describe these 
distinct forms of valuation as being a priori incommensurable, we should instead 
look at these interfaith events as particular institutional forms that enable the de-
velopment of specific commonalities, differences, and incommensurabilities. 
Negotiating difference and incommensuration in the articles 
in this collection
This collection does not dream of a world without borders, but rather focuses upon 
the many forms of ethics that can be a practice upon borders. Anthropologists 
have historically viewed constructed borders as interrupting ethically positive re-
lationships, as resulting in hostility, injustice, and oppression, and as being ripe for 
deconstruction (e.g., Evens 2009), yet recent work on the ethics of detachment has 
shown that some forms of ethically positive relationship actually depend on efforts 
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to distance, separate, and detach (Candea 2010; Candea et al. 2015). Similarly, in 
this collection, our contributors explore forms of action that are attempts not to 
dissolve borders, but to establish ethical practices upon them, through them, and 
across them. Our goal is to look at the commensurable and the incommensurable 
as they emerge from practice.
Jan Lorenz, for instance, takes quite seriously the notion that incommensura-
bilities between traditions might be a given—that is, along with Michael Lambek, 
he sees incommensurability as an inevitable, natural aspect of society, rather than 
a necessarily created feature. He also uses incommensurability in a subtly different 
fashion from us—he is, for example, less concerned to distinguish between incom-
mensurability and difference. Yet his article provides a superb example of what we 
see as incommensuration. He describes a dispute within a Jewish congregation for 
whom a quorum of ten adult male Jews—a minyan—is required for the commence-
ment of a service. At the heart of this dispute was a conflict between completely dif-
ferent registers of reckoning Jewish identity; the question was thus whether several 
newer members of the congregation could be counted toward this quorum. Lorenz 
demonstrates (contra Zigon 2007) that the moral breakdown this precipitated did 
not cause any kind of alteration to habitual ethical behavior. Rather, his interlocu-
tors were able to come to a compromise—an ethical way of relating to one anoth-
er—by the maintenance of the prior incommensurability. They did so by deciding 
to count the new congregants within a minyan composed in any case of more than 
ten adult male Jews whose status was not in doubt. Here our interpretation differs 
from Lorenz; we see this as a decision to defer difference in favor of maintaining 
incommensurability. This skillful social play (compromise seems too blunt a word) 
enabled the two incommensurable ways of reckoning Jewish identity to be kept in 
such a way that they could not be judged by a single moral standard, and it thus 
deferred their transference into difference, a state in which their incompatibility 
would be obvious and inescapable. In other words, we see here a practice of incom-
mensuration that rests upon skillful action and judgment, and enables a particular 
kind of ethics across borders.
Another example is to be found in John Marenbon’s article, in which he de-
monstrates how the medieval theologian Boethius of Dacia maintained, often with 
great difficulty, an incommensurability between the Christian tradition to which 
he belonged and a pagan other. Incommensuration between the traditions, we ar-
gue, is what enabled him to participate in a conversation across that border. This 
might seem paradoxical, yet if Boethius had allowed the tradition of the other to 
be judged by a common Christian standard, his opportunities for dialogue with it 
would have been destroyed. In other words, it was only in resisting that particular 
form of leveling, or translating, and in thus preserving the incommensurable bor-
der between self and other, that he was able to maintain dialogue.
Paolo Heywood is concerned to show how constructions of difference can be as 
important as construction of similarity in situations of ethics across borders. Just 
as we here seek to show how incommensurabilities are best thought of as practices 
rather than natural facts, Heywood is concerned to investigate the ways in which 
the borders across which ethics is carried on “are as much a product of construction 
as the parties involved” (this collection). Heywood thus shows how some kinds of 
ethical conversation require the difference between participants to be emphasized 
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and recognized if they are to be performatively successful. The Italian LGBTQ ac-
tivists with whom he works see no point in engaging in explicitly ethical dialogue 
with a nonofficial Catholic group (We Are Church) because the latter too closely 
approximate the activists’ own idea of what the good is, and thus do not represent 
a realistic partner for dialogue that can successfully create ethical bridges between 
Catholics and activists. Heywood’s article thus draws our attention to a pressing 
question within the study of difference: What are the consequences of two parties 
failing to agree upon the nature of difference? We wish to extend this interest in the 
construction of difference to ask whether the construction of incommensurables 
might also be a factor in determining the performative success of ethical dialogue. 
Is an agreement upon the nature of incommensurability necessary for an effective 
dialogue through (rather than across) difference? Or does incommensurability ul-
timately only enable ethical discussion when the partner in a debate is silent (as in 
Marenbon’s example, where Aristotle cannot respond to Boethius of Dacia)?
Even if incommensuration does not always enable ethical communication, it 
might still be argued that a skillful balancing of incommensurabilities remains 
crucial for ethical attempts to speak to the other in those kinds of tradition that 
Lambek (this collection) describes as “earnest.” In some situations, such as the me-
dieval Christian tradition described by Marenbon, any attempt to acknowledge 
the ethical nature of another tradition can imperil one’s commitment to the truth 
claims of one’s own tradition. As the philosophical gymnastics of Boethius demon-
strate, however, one way of overcoming this is by incommensurating aspects of that 
other tradition to one’s own.
A question that this raises is whether we can ever think about the success of any 
ethical dialogue in anything other than the narrowly defined terms of those who are 
speaking. The skillful and judicious (to borrow Lambek’s phrasing) maintenance of 
incommensurabilities is shown within these examples to constitute one way of per-
formatively succeeding within such interactions. But such success is reliant upon 
the paucity—or thinness—of the conditions that define such success. Skillful acts 
of keeping incommensurability in the picture even when common standards for 
judgment appear to present themselves are thus evidently crucial to much ethi-
cal action. Yet incommensurability is unstable; it requires continuous construction 
and rebuilding if it is to provide a firm basis for dialogue. And it is by no means a 
sure producer of “successful” dialogue. 
Focusing upon the way incommensuration is carefully balanced with com-
mensuration in diverse ethnographic cases promises to help us to overcome the 
methodological problems that had limited previous anthropological engagements 
with ethics across borders. It enables us to understand, through an ethnographic 
appreciation of processes, the production of forms of alterity that can both enable 
and foreclose dialogue.
It is worth, at this point, returning to the assumption that Marenbon attributes 
to MacIntyre: the idea that for most people in most places, difference can be seen 
only as a problem of translation, and that incommensurable difference is not rec-
ognized as such. We argue, rather, that incommensuration might be thought of as 
a frequent aspect of ethics across borders, in which people strive to resist both as-
similation and differentiation. It is the process by which things are kept within dif-
ferent registers of judgment, and it rests upon ethical judgment in the Aristotelian 
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sense (Lambek 2000; Aristotle 2004). It is not that incommensurables are not trans-
lated—for even a failed translation would imply a transformation of incommensu-
rability into difference—it is that they are left untranslatable.
Our view of incommensurability can thus be seen as existing in a productive 
ethical tension of difference to the views of other contributors to this collection, in 
particular, Lambek. This raises a question about the various ways in which diffe-
rentiation, commensuration, and incommensuration need to be thought of as dis-
tinct practices that undergird ethics across borders. Differentiation and commen-
suration are both (paradoxically) processes that bind separate traditions and ideas 
together: commensuration because it strives for similitude, and differentiation 
because it draws separate ideas into a web of possible comparisons and contrasts. 
As Tom Boellstorff points out, some kinds of translation work not just because 
they include failure, but because they “revel” in it (2005: 5). If differentiation is the 
skillful proliferation of failures in translation that provides the productive basis for 
future ethical communication, incommensuration is the ethical work of refusing 
even failed translation. Wendy Espeland and Mitchell Stevens describe commen-
suration as “a system for discarding information and organizing what remains into 
new forms” (1998: 317). Incommensuration might, by contrast, be thought of as 
the practice in which a proliferation of information is insisted upon so that com-
parison is always made to fail.
Where we do agree with Lambek (this collection) is in his assertion that, con-
trary to much anthropological theory, incommensurables are not contradictory. 
Why should this be so? Difference, of course, implies the possibility of contradic-
tions, as do similarities. Yet incommensurability is by definition a relationship that 
precludes any kind of comparison. Incommensuration might thus be seen a stra-
tegy to avoid conflict, a scarce resource that has to be judiciously maintained in 
interaction for some forms of ethics across borders to be possible.
Conclusion
This collection focuses comparative attention on some issues and away from oth-
ers, as any thematically organized project must. The cases and arguments presented 
raise a number of questions that neither we nor the other contributors have had 
space to address at length. One of these is the issue of power. A goal of our project 
is to see ethics across borders “from the native’s point of view,” and this makes com-
bining our approach with various forms of political critique difficult, though not, 
we suspect, impossible. We hope that others will take up this challenge.
Another question raised but not yet answered is the relationship of ethics across 
borders to the category of religion. It is notable that all but one of the articles pre-
sented here, including this introductory essay, draw their key case studies from 
religious contexts. In a small collection, we cover Judaism, Catholicism, Pentecos-
talism, and a number of forms of Islam. Is it that the category of “world religion” 
is intrinsically plural in conception, so that traditions that have come to see them-
selves through the prism of some version of the religion category are particularly 
disposed to engage in or think about ethics across borders? Perhaps the reason for 
the bias is simply that anthropologists and historians interested in ethics are also 
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often interested in religion. How would our conclusions have been different had 
our examples been drawn from, say, international politics and law? Or from deve-
lopment? Again, we hope that others will be able to answer these questions in future 
work on ethics across borders. 10
In the previous section, we explored forms of ethical practice that rely on the 
creation of incomparable regimes of value as much as they rely upon affinities and 
resemblances. The importance of this is that it demonstrates why the ethnography 
of ethics across borders might actually lead to an anthropological reevaluation of 
those borders themselves. 
Countless words have been written about anthropology as a practice of eth-
ics across borders. In this introduction, we have attempted to shift the conversa-
tion from one that asks how anthropology should relate ethically across borders, 
to one that asks how anthropology can understand how others relate ethically 
across borders and respond ethically to borders. The end result, we hope, has been 
a historicization of anthropology’s own ethics across borders. How, then, might 
we approach ethnography as ethics in light of this historicization of our own core 
methodologies?
Anthropologists who have seen their discipline as a kind of ethics across bor-
ders can be separated into two broad categories of those who see ethics across bor-
ders as a means to an end and those who see it as the end in itself. For example, it 
has long been noted that Mead’s classic “relativist”’ account of Samoan adolescence 
was actually a means within a larger debate, the end of which was the altering of 
American self-understanding (Mead 1928). It was a typical example of anthropo-
logical one-way relativism; the other was not expected to teach us, but we could 
learn from our image of it. Examples of ethics across borders as means to an end 
are similarly found in the ethnographic examples in this collection, for example in 
Simon Coleman’s description of charismatic “overflow,” in which an ethics across 
borders is only ever a means to a particular kind of self-formation. By contrast, the 
kind of anthropology envisioned in this collection by Lambek, which is inspired 
by Gadamer, sees an ethical relation to an other as an end in itself. In Heywood’s 
article, we find an example of a liberal Catholic who views ethical dialogue as an 
end in itself. One reason for this Catholic’s failure to engage LGBTQ activists could 
be the latter’s understanding of that dialogue as a means to social progression that 
he was ill equipped to facilitate.
 In recent years the notion of anthropology as an end-in-itself ethics across bor-
ders has gained in prominence thanks to what Joel Robbins (2013) has described as 
the development of an anthropology of suffering. Robbins describes how in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, a generation of anthropologists who no longer felt morally 
able to define their discipline as the study of a savage other shifted their relation to 
those they studied from “one of analytic distance and critical comparison focused 
on difference to one of empathic connection and moral witnessing based on hu-
man unity” (ibid.: 453). Such an anthropology—often going hand in hand with a 
desire to uncover the global abuses of “neoliberalism”—takes as its moral objective 
the documentation of others’ precultural suffering so as to show that they are just 
like us in their humanity (e.g., Biehl 2005). This moment in anthropology is, if we 
10. Our thanks to Hau’s anonymous reviewers for drawing our attention to these issues. 
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are to follow Didier Fassin (2012), the result of a more general shift over the last 
two decades to a politics of humanitarianism that is fundamentally unstable. That 
is, it presents itself as being a politics of equality, for it recognizes the essential 
similarity between ourselves and the other, whilst necessarily being a politics of 
inequality, for the compassion at its heart is a result of a focus on the poor (ibid.: 3).
This form of anthropology as ethics across borders is not always ethnographi-
cally productive, for it tends to cast our informants as the mere object of our own 
ethical practice, and thus fails to accurately grasp the ways in which they them-
selves are engaging in an ethics of sentiment. It objectifies passive suffering as 
the pan-human aspect that binds us to them and as a result ends up committing 
the fault of denying the other’s creativity and inventiveness (Wagner 1975: 15). 
There are other ways of framing this relationship: Harri Englund (this collection) 
provides us with an ethnographically informed way of talking about moral sen-
timents and suffering as the objects of ethical discourse. He describes Zambia’s 
“radio grandfathers,” who engage in an explicitly hierarchical multivocality that 
avoids the pitfall of “constructing voiceless subjects to whom they might give a 
voice as an act of charity or justice.” Instead, they attempt to be the subjects who 
mediate and thus frame these voices. Theirs is an ethics of sympathy rather than 
compassion; it is mindful of the hierarchies in which it is embedded, and it is a 
product of skillful storytelling.
This is not to say that we are pessimistic about anthropology as ethics; it is just 
that we want to avoid a situation in which anthropological ethics become a meth-
odological stumbling block to understanding ethnographic cases of ethics across 
borders. Anthropologists have long attempted to engage in ethical practice through 
forms of methodological relativism, yet they have also recognized the ethical di-
lemmas that this can produce. Can one really claim to be taking the other’s ethical 
view seriously if one is choosing to bracket its “truth and seriousness” through a 
relativistic method (Rabinow 1983)? This collection has sought to show that an-
thropologists aren’t the only ones asking such questions, and that it is often our 
methodology that masks the fact that we share such preoccupations with our inter-
locutors (cf. Wagner 1975).
Anthropologists have recently asked how the study of ethics might help us move 
beyond the problems of methodological relativism. According to Laidlaw, for ex-
ample, anthropology as an ethics across borders must be understood as a “form of 
self-fashioning” (2014: 217), in which we can learn both about the other and from 
them. 
What, we might ask, distinguishes this approach from those charismatic 
Christians (Coleman, this collection) who also see ethics across borders as a prac-
tice of self-formation? One answer is that the kinds of openended engagements en-
visioned by both Laidlaw (2014) and Lambek (this collection) do not (in Wagner’s 
terms) obviate the creativeness of the other, but instead seek to build upon it. By 
contrast, Coleman’s charismatics ultimately engage with the other only so as to 
efface any specificity that that other might possess. Just like earlier generations of 
anthropologists who either assumed a priori a relativist or political economy view 
of ethics across borders, the charismatics’ response to the challenges of a cross-
border ethics ultimately tells us more about them than about the ethical other with 
whom they engage. 
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We tend to assume that speaking across borders is the animating force behind 
our discipline; that it is what makes anthropology an inherently moral pursuit. The 
contributions to this collection show that we should be attentive to the ways in 
which a similar impulse may guide the ethical lives of those about whom we write. 
Cases of ethics across borders are uniquely problematic for anthropologists; we 
would do well to remember that they are problematic for our interlocutors too.
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L’éthique à l’épreuve des frontières: incommensurabilité et affinité
Résumé : Cet article se saisit d’une question méthodologique et éthique canonique 
pour l’anthropologue (comment établir notre rapport aux autres ?) et la transforme 
en une question ethnographique (comment est-ce que ceux que nous étudions 
pensent éthiquement face aux frontières ?) Nous montrons que, paradoxalement, 
l’adhésion de l’anthropologue à ses propres formes d’éthique dans une situa-
tion étrangère a fréquemment effacé les conceptions alternatives des personnes 
étudiées, tandis que l’anthropologie de l’éthique a réintroduit les notions de dé-
limitation culturelle et d’incommensurabilité dans le canon anthropologique. De 
plus, au sein de la discipline anthropologique, l’attention particulière portée à la 
motivation universelle et au relativisme culturel a fait perdre de vue le moment 
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où l’éthique se confronte aux frontières, moment dont l’existence stipule l’existence 
de différences éthiques et la possibilité de les transcender. En nous inspirant d’un 
exemple emprunté au travail d’Evans sur les musulmans ahmadis en Inde, nous 
développons l’idée que l’éthique, lorsque mise à l’épreuve des frontières, dépend 
autant de la production et de l’élaboration de la différence incommensurable—un 
procès que nous appelons « incommensuration »—que de l’identification d’affinités. 
Comme le montre l’ensemble des articles que cet article présente, l’éthique au-delà 
des frontières doit être un phénomène plus répandu qu’on ne l’imagine, qui mérite 
plus de travaux ethnographiques, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les diverses 
manières dont la différence et l’affinité sont imaginées.
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